

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INFUSED AND THE  
ACQUIRED MORAL VIRTUES

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A DISSERTATION

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Arts in Religious Education

SUMMER SCHOOL OF SACRED THEOLOGY FOR SISTERS

PROVIDENCE COLLEGE

PROVIDENCE 8, RHODE ISLAND

1958

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## PREFACE

Josef Pieper, in his work, Fortitude and Temperance, distinguishes three orders in connection with virtue - the pre-moral, or psychological disposition, the moral, or properly ethical, and the supernatural, or infused virtue. He claims that a uniformity of attitude of mind underlies all three orders,

. . . in spite of the differences that separate the sphere of mental health from those of the morally good and of the mystic life. These differences are real, and they should not be blurred. But the tendency has been too often to isolate each sphere from the others. Their inner, essential and reciprocal connections have not been sufficiently noticed.'

This modern thinker has well formulated the problem of which this paper treats in part, at least. The psychological sphere needs much further investigation, so no more than passing notice is given it here. The interrelation of the acquired virtues and the infused is hinted at in various texts of St. Thomas and is somewhat more clearly developed by his commentators. This paper does not pretend to do more than to gather teaching and opinions on the subject, not very simple where St. Thomas is concerned, for it is often difficult to ascertain whether he is referring to acquired or infused virtues in the treatise on habits in the Summa

Theologica.

This study begins with a comparison of the acquired and the infused virtues in respect to their efficient cause, subject, object quo and quod, the fundamental aspects of habits. Then the relationship of the virtues in exercise and in increase is studied, coming to a conclusion which, if not entirely satisfactory, may find excuse in Dr. Pieper's words about his own study of the ". . . inner, essential and reciprocal connections of the psychological, moral, and mystical spheres . . . whose complicated interactions we in all probability will never wholly grasp."<sup>2</sup>



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## CHAPTER I

## COMPARISON OF THE ACQUIRED AND INFUSED MORAL VIRTUES

The moral virtues are concerned with principles of human acts by which man is to attain his end. Having been given his goal by God, man has also been given the help necessary to attain the goal, in both the natural and supernatural orders. In the natural order man may cultivate those moral virtues which will help him to act according to right reason; in the supernatural order God gives man the habits which will enable him to proceed towards his eternal happiness, acting not from reason alone, but from reason illumined by faith.<sup>3</sup>

Generally the distinctions between the acquired and the infused habits are clearly made, but an effort to show their relationship may emphasize their interdependence in the living of a life, at once human and supernatural. A comparison of the two classes of virtues may well begin with a consideration of their causes.

Without disregarding the very necessary distinctions made by theologians, with regard to the cause of virtue in us, it may be stated that both the infused and acquired

virtues are caused by God; the former directly, the latter indirectly. That the infused virtues are a gratuitous gift of God, accompanying the infusion of sanctifying grace in the soul, may be deduced from the fact that man cannot merit, nor can he acquire, the power to perform supernatural acts, which, as their name implies, are above the powers of human nature. The acquired virtues, on the other hand, are caused immediately by the repetition of acts on the part of the individual, and may therefore be considered as caused by the agent. They are, however, caused indirectly by God, in that they are in human nature inchoatively and by aptitude, that is, man is disposed by the very nature God has given him to the practice of the moral virtues.<sup>4</sup>

This disposition is twofold.<sup>5</sup> There is the fundamental orientation of human nature towards the good of reason, common to every human being. In the state of original justice this subordination of the powers to reason was uncontested, but even in fallen nature there remains an essential rectitude in the will, which, however, requires development and safeguarding, and this is accomplished by the acquisition of virtue.<sup>6</sup> There is the other aspect of disposition that corresponds to Pieper's pre-moral order, a mental health favorable to the cultivation of virtue.<sup>7</sup> This disposition varies from one person to another, one with greater ease



acquiring fortitude, another being naturally inclined to temperance. The cultivation of habit according to natural disposition does not insure the acquisition of all moral virtues, or the making of a moral person, since the tendency of a man to restrain his anger, in the example given by St. Thomas, while placing no restrictions on himself in matters of concupiscence, is no virtue, since he is lacking prudence in matters of concupiscence, though he has a certain habit of controlling his anger.<sup>8</sup> The natural moral virtues are all connected in prudence, and he who has prudence has the others, since it directs the other virtues.<sup>9</sup> The man who has truly acquired the cardinal virtues will probably not possess them all to the same degree, because he will be naturally more inclined to one than to the others and will have that one to a higher degree. Thus, even the saints are distinguished for certain virtues, though any saint must possess them all.

It is the duty of man, as an intelligent being, to fuse these two aspects of disposition which he has, and to set about the acquisition of good habits, or virtues. This he does by the repetition of acts, and, apart from miraculous intervention on the part of God, there is no other way for him to obtain them. In question 51<sup>10</sup>, St. Thomas makes clear that habits, both intellectual and moral, but more especially



moral, are produced by repeated acts. In man the will is moved by the intellect, and in turn produces acts of the appetitive power, so that it is both moved and mover. Everything that is moved by another is disposed by the action of an agent, and a repetition of acts will qualify the power that is moved, and this quality is called a habit. Thus the habits of the moral virtues are caused in the appetitive powers as they are moved consistently by reason. This qualification of the power is caused when the passive power is completely controlled by the active principle and all the contrary dispositions are dispelled. But the appetitive powers are inclined to many particular goods. Therefore it is impossible that a virtuous moral habit be formed by one act of the intellect judging what should be done, since no judgment could weigh all the circumstances and aspects of the various appetitive acts. It is only by the repetition of acts according to the same fundamental judgment that the habit is acquired.

The man who has set himself to the acquisition of the moral virtues can never feel that he has completed his task, since there will always be some of the potential parts of any one of the cardinal virtues which he has never had an opportunity to practice. For example, a man of moderate means, who possesses the virtue of justice in many of its aspects,

will not have the matter for the practice of magnificence. However, if he should come into great wealth, he would not experience difficulty in acquiring the habit, if justice is established fundamentally in his will.<sup>11</sup>

This is perhaps the occasion to draw attention to a striking difference between the infused and acquired virtues in respect to their annexed virtues. As has been said, the acquisition of habits of some of the potential parts of a virtue does not include the acquisition of all the annexed virtues, though it disposes for them. The infusion of the moral virtues, on the other hand, extends to all the parts of each virtue, so there is no power lacking to one in the state of grace to place a supernatural act of any virtue whatsoever.

A study of the acquired and infused virtues includes a consideration of the subject of the various virtues. St. Thomas agrees with Aristotle that the intellectual virtues are rational in their essence, and that the moral virtues are rational by participation.<sup>12</sup> He goes on to reason that rational in essence and by participation signifies the powers of the soul. Hence, powers of the soul are the subjects of virtue. The subjects are further specified, since St. Thomas shows how prudence, ratio recta agibilia, is in the intellect, justice in the will, and fortitude and tem-



perance in the irascible and concupiscible appetites respectively, in as much as these are subject to reason.<sup>13</sup> The latter is a somewhat disputed matter, and St. Thomas' position should be made clear. A power is ordered to act, and in each power that can be the principle of a human act, there should be virtue disposing to that act. A human act is one which is proper to man, and as in man the lower appetites are meant to be subject to reason, the acts of these appetites, in so far as they are thus subject, are human acts and therefore flow from a power capable of being the subject of a virtuous habit.<sup>14</sup> St. Thomas uses again the principle of the moved mover, as he did in explaining the formation of habit. In this instance the lower appetite is moved by the will and in turn moves the external members. There would be no problem were it not for the fact that the lower appetites are not completely subject to reason, but are attracted to particular sense goods, according to the inclination of their nature. Hence, to conform these lower appetites to reason there is necessity of virtuous habits in them, for otherwise their acts would be imperfect. By way of analogy, Kreisler could not produce the great music of which he is capable on a defective violin.

However, this is not where the main objection to St. Thomas' reasoning lies. The crucial problem is with regard

to the subject of the infused virtues of temperance and fortitude. The argument of St. Thomas still holds, for it is not the will which needs ordination to the supernatural order with respect to the objects of the concupiscible and irascible appetites, since sense good is not the object of the will, but of those sensitive appetites themselves. For the perfect operation of man's supernatural life it is necessary that his lower appetites be subject to reason illumined and moved by grace, and this harmony makes fitting the presence of the infused virtues of fortitude and temperance in the irascible and concupiscible appetites themselves.

It must be admitted that St. Thomas, in treating of the subject of the moral virtues in the Summa Theologica, does not distinguish between the natural and the supernatural, but in the Virtues in General, he states:

Infused temperance is in the concupiscible appetite. The irascible as well as the concupiscible appetites receive the name of reason, or rational, insofar as they participate in some way in reason, according as they obey it.<sup>15</sup>

Billot takes exception to this position in reasoning summed up thus in the Dictionnaire de Theologie:

The only acceptable solution seems to be to consider the will itself as the subject of the infused virtues of temperance and fortitude. By these virtues the will would be enabled to use the good natural dispositions of the organism to conform them habitually to the rule, not only of reason, but of faith and charity. This habitual conformity in the human organism would



be, not the infused virtue, but its complement.<sup>16</sup>

Theologians who are of this opinion reason that it is not fitting that the infused moral virtues be in the sensitive appetite, that a supernatural power be in an organic faculty. The obvious analogy of the soul and body does not hold, since the soul is not an accident, as are the virtues. St. Thomas agrees that there can be no virtuous act on the part of the irascible or concupiscible powers independently of reason, since the chief element of a virtuous act is in the will.<sup>17</sup> Billot thinks the conformity of the sensitive appetites to the direction of the infused virtues is acquired through the exercise of the infused virtues. Good habitual dispositions are developed, which are not, however, acquired virtues, since the formal object is not that of the natural virtues.<sup>18</sup>

When one turns to the object of the acquired and the infused moral virtues a distinction is necessary, since the object of both categories of virtue is good human acts. These are the material object and cannot determine the specific difference between supernatural and natural moral virtue.

St. Thomas asks whether the virtue acquired by habituation belongs to the same species as infused virtue. He answers negatively with a twofold distinction. The first

is the fundamental Thomistic principle that habits are specified by acts, and acts by objects, the object taken as the formal object. The formal object of the natural virtues is the good of reason, that is, the mean determined by human reason. The formal object of the supernatural virtues is supernatural good which is in no way proportionate to the natural powers of man, though the good of reason will always be in conformity with the supernatural good, for God is the Author of nature and supernature, and the supernatural is established on reason illumined by faith.<sup>19</sup> Elsewhere St. Thomas looks again at the formal object of acquired and natural virtues, and he writes:

Here, just as the natural light of reason is the root and principle of acquired virtue; so the light of grace, which is a participation in the Divine Nature, dwelling in the very essence of the soul in the form of a certain character (*habilitas*) is the root and principle of infused virtue.<sup>20</sup>

The other "specific difference among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed", as St. Thomas points out.<sup>21</sup> Human virtue is directed to the good of human reason, supernatural virtue to the good as defined by Divine Law - eternal beatitude. The one has a temporal, finite, human end; the other a supernatural, Divine end, everlasting life. The good of reason, the end of the virtuous human act, is itself the means to the end of the supernatural virtues, because the act conformable to human reason is also



the object of the infused virtue, as the greater, the Divine measure, includes what it exceeds, the human measure.<sup>22</sup> St.

Thomas sums up the distinction nicely as follows:

Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to the Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to "chastise his body and bring it into subjection" (I Cor. ix. 27), by abstinence in food, drink, and the like.<sup>23</sup>

Lumbreras seems to be indicating the same when he writes:

It follows that infused prudence dictates the acts of the moral virtues not only as means to their proximate ends, but also as means to the supernatural last end. It presupposes then a good disposition both toward the proximate end, through the moral virtues, and toward the ultimate end, through charity.<sup>24</sup>

Garrigou-Lagrange summarizes the teaching of St.

Thomas on the subject and object of the virtues as follows:

1. Habits as received forms in us are specified and distinguished according to the differing active principles by which they are produced, since every agent produces its like, in so far as it acts according to its own proper determination. Thus the infused habits are a participation in the intimate life of God, by whom they are pro-



duced; likewise the acquired moral virtues are specified by the act of directing reason, from which they arise.

2. Habits, as habits, in relation to the nature to which they are suitable or unsuitable, are specified and distinguished according to the nature to which they conform or do not conform; infused habits according to the Divine Nature participated in; the acquired habits according to human nature, to which they are suitable (as virtues) or unsuitable (vices).
3. Operative habits, relative to their operations, are specified and distinguished according to the specific difference of the object of operation. Thus the infused habits are specified by an object essentially supernatural, the acquired habits by an object attainable by reason.<sup>25</sup>

The specification of the act by the formal object suggests the whole question of merit, the reward God gives for man's good works. There is a scale of activity possible to man, ranging from that arising from fides informata to that which flows from a soul enjoying mystical union with God.

It has already been mentioned that the person who has never been justified can in no way merit a supernatural reward, since there is no proportion between his natural powers and his supernatural end.

There is a difference to be noted in the man who has been justified, but has fallen into sin. Such a one, unless he has sinned against faith or hope, will still possess those theological virtues, although they are dead, uninformed by



by charity. Again, this man can in no way perform a supernaturally meritorious work, but he still has the power of believing and hoping, which God may move by an actual grace and so bring him to repentance and charity by His Mercy.<sup>26</sup>

When one comes to consider the man in the state of grace and the relationship between his act, his charity, and his reward, the problem is more complex. St. Thomas treats of it at some length in his Commentary on the Sentences, II, Dist. XL, q. 1, a. 5. It is certain that no deliberate human act can be indifferent, for it must be directed to an end either in conformity with, or opposed to, reason. For one having grace, a good act must be meritorious, for, since charity commands all the virtues, as the will commands all acts, it follows that whatever is ordained to the end of any virtue is ordained to the end of charity, and since every good act is ordained to the end of some virtue it will be ordained to the end of charity, and will thus be meritorious. Thus to eat and to drink within the bounds of temperance, and to play at recreation according to the measure of eutrapelia, will be meritorious in him who has charity by which he sets God as the final end of his life.

In the answer to the sixth objection in this article St. Thomas makes the matter somewhat more precise:

An habitual ordination of act to God does not entirely suffice; because one merits nothing from which is in

habitu, but only from that which is done in act. It is not, however, necessary that the actual intention to the final end be joined always to any action whatsoever directed to a proximate end; but it suffices that there should be from time to time a referring of all those proximate ends to the final end, as is done when one in thought gives himself wholly to the love of God.<sup>27</sup>

In this act every other is directed likewise to God and is therefore meritorious. Father Goudin distinguishes three degrees in this ordination to God.<sup>28</sup> The first is a general and confused relation to God which renders one's works meritorious, but only slightly and imperfectly so. This is the state of one in grace who acts from natural motives, and of him Our Lord's words are not too commendatory: "If you love those who love you, what title have you to a reward?"<sup>29</sup> In the next place are those works in which there is a greater influx of charity, because they are related to an act that was fully informed, and so all share in the purity of the first intention. Such might be a fervent Morning Offering, or better, a complete surrender of oneself at the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. In this case, all one's habitual virtuous acts would be included in the ordination to the final end, God Himself, and therefore meritorious in a more perfect way. The third degree supposes a more perfect and vital intention of charity in a particular act. This actual intention of charity renders the work most perfectly meritorious, even in the smallest acts, as the Apostle suggests: "In eating, in



drinking, in all that you do, do everything as for God's glory".<sup>30</sup>

It is clear from St. Thomas, and from Father Goudin's commentary, that no act of one having charity is lacking in merit, be it the imperfect merit of the tepid, or the more perfectly meritorious act of one who has a pure intention. The question is: whence do these acts arise?

Every human being in the state of grace has probably experienced moments when he has been aware that his virtuous act was beyond the power of achievement of his natural virtue. It could well have been God moving him to the exercise of an infused moral virtue. I do not mean to imply that the placing of every act of an infused virtue is accompanied by such realization and exhilaration, but it does suggest the possibility of different kinds of supernatural acts, those which theologians distinguish as supernatural quoad substantiam from those supernatural quoad modum.<sup>31</sup>

The second member of the distinction is well known. How often one is told to "offer it up". A man is moved by a natural grace from God to the act of acquired justice of paying a debt, because it is a reasonable thing to do, he will lose credit, and so on. As he winces interiorly at the thought of parting with the money, he supernaturalizes the act by making an offering of it to Our Lord, Who was

stripped of all His possessions. A large portion of the lives of good Catholics is supernatural in this way. The exercise of a purely natural virtue is raised by intention, under the operation of supernatural grace, to the supernatural order, the act being modally supernatural.

On the other hand, the man who owes a debt may, under the action of grace, approach the matter quite differently. Through faith he may see in his creditor a member of Jesus Christ, Christ Himself, according to Our Lord's words: "When you did it to one of the least of my brethren, you did it to me",<sup>32</sup> and in this act, supernatural in its genesis, since man is moved to it by supernatural grace, and supernatural in its end, the infused virtue of justice is operative.

Theoretically, the distinction is not difficult to make. In the actual living of our lives there can be some confusion. Probably we should not even attempt to classify our acts as supernatural quoad substantiam or quoad modum, or be anxious about the ratio of the one to the other since that ultimately depends upon God's action in the soul. What is important is that we do not resist His action, for He will give His grace in greater measure according as we are faithful.



## CHAPTER II

## THE EXERCISE OF THE ACQUIRED AND THE INFUSED MORAL VIRTUES

A more practical problem is that of the relationship between acquired and infused virtues in the exercise or in the placing of acts of virtue. Granted the existence of acquired and infused moral virtues, one may view the activity of each independent of the other, and that of each in conjunction with the other.

In any discussion of man placing acts of natural virtue, one must recall that such a person is in the state of mortal sin. With sanctifying grace the moral virtues are infused into the soul, and it is impossible for man in the state of grace to act apart from the supernatural principle he possesses, as has been shown.

The man who does not possess the supernatural moral virtues will be turned away from further sin by his acquired virtues, more or less completely, with greater or lesser struggle, depending upon the strength of his acquired habits. One with a well-founded habit of justice will not have the difficulties in making out Income Tax returns, as will a man who has done little to cultivate that virtue. Although in

most cases man can be turned away from sin by acquired virtue, since sin is against human reason, he cannot avoid in this manner the sin of infidelity, or sins against the other theological virtues.<sup>34</sup> Hence the imperfection of his life, no matter how perfectly he may think he possesses the acquired virtues. Indeed, such virtue is called by St. Thomas "virtue in a restricted sense," since it can direct man with regard to proximate ends, but not with respect simply to his final end.<sup>35</sup> In fact, these virtues, without the presence of charity, cease to have the stability of true virtue, and take on the nature of dispositions, on the way to destruction.<sup>36</sup> Nevertheless there is an important point to bear in mind especially in the training of the young. It is the necessity of cultivating in them the natural virtues. If later in life they are so unfortunate as to lose sanctifying grace, and with it the infused virtues, they have no power to lead a good life, even humanly speaking, unless the natural virtues have been acquired. The presence of such good habits will prevent added sins, since, as has already been said, the natural virtues can enable a man to avoid mortal sin in most cases.

On the other hand, if a man has acquired the moral virtues, failure to make use of them is sinful, since a vicious act is against his rational nature, and in acting con-



trary to the fundamental laws of his nature, man sins against the Author of that nature. Perhaps an observation could be made with regard to the attitude adopted by some that, in consideration of the infused virtues, the acquired are not of great importance. It is an evaluation that seems to underlie the thinking of those who give generously to charitable enterprises, but evade taxes or fines and do not consider it reprehensible.

Viewed under another aspect, it is possible for the exercise of the acquired virtues to act as a dispositive cause of the infused virtues, with the aid of actual grace.

The Dictionnaire de Theologie presents the argument thus:

With the help of operating or cooperating actual grace, human activity has its role to play in the production of virtues, as in that of grace. This role is one of a purely material causality, in as much as our acts dispose the subject to receive grace and the virtues. These supernatural dispositions can be strengthened simply, as acts freeing our soul from inclinations contrary to grace, attachment to mortal sin; it is the disposition called in theology removens prohibens. Such is attrition. But our acts can go further and by reason of their very perfection reach to the threshold of the supernatural life, producing in us a positive disposition which calls for, which demands, the infusion of grace and the virtues. This is the case of perfect contrition in justification ex opere operantis. In either case the causality proper to our acts remains purely material and achieves nothing more than dispositions in the soul. Divine causality alone efficiently produces grace and the virtues. <sup>37</sup>



St. Thomas' words on this matter are: "Although infused virtue is not caused by our acts, still our acts can dispose for it. . . ." <sup>38</sup>

Regardless of the dispositive effects of the practice of the acquired virtues, it is necessary to return always to the fundamental truth that the infusion of the moral virtues depends upon God alone, and man may never claim that he has so disposed himself as to merit the reception of the infused virtues.

Garrigou-Lagrange has summarized the status and effects of the acquired virtues without the infused:

St. Thomas moreover shows that without charity true acquired moral virtues may exist as easily moved dispositions, as was the case with many pagans; it is not possible for them to exist as virtues moved only with difficulty, when charity is not present, because man, without charity, is turned directly away from his final supernatural goal, and indirectly from his final natural end, since the natural law prescribes: "God is to be obeyed in whatever He commands, even in a higher order." A man turned away from his final end is easily inclined to evil, so that true acquired moral virtues cannot exist in him as virtues, difficult of change, but as true virtues only on the part of the object. On the part of the subject, they can be only dispositions, either towards becoming virtue, or ceasing to be. Thus, after one mortal sin by which charity is lost, these virtues begin to deteriorate, heading for destruction. <sup>39</sup>

Not only is it possible for God to do so, but He often does give the supernatural virtues without any previous good dispositions on the part of the recipient, as, for

example, in infant baptism. If a baptized child is quite untrained and does little about developing the seeds of natural virtue within himself, how will this affect his supernatural life?

There can be no doubt that, apart from extraordinary graces, such a one will find the practice of supernatural virtue difficult. The absence of acquired virtue does not create a moral vacuum, but supposes, if not vice, at least dispositions towards vice, and these natural, contrary inclinations entice the youth's appetite in one direction, while the grace of the infused virtues moves it in another. St. Thomas remarks a bit wryly in The Virtues in General that the infused virtue does not in the beginning operate with much delight, as many can substantiate.<sup>40</sup> There are probably far too many engaged in a struggle without real necessity. How many children or adolescents can so much as name the cardinal virtues? Still fewer have had consistent training in the exercise of prudence, of justice in its elementary forms, of physical courage and moral fortitude, of self-denial or any kind of voluntary austerity. Air-conditioning, aspirin tablets, tranquilizers, not to mention the growing national inability to make prudential judgments and take responsibility, because of high-pressure advertising and salesmanship, all are dissolving the natural moral fabric



of modern man, and even more of modern woman. It is axiomatic that grace perfects nature, but there is an implication of an already vigorous goodness that is capable of being perfected. The power to act supernaturally is in no way lessened in one who has done little to acquire virtue, but its operation is impeded by dispositions contrary to its end, and such a one may easily remain mediocre, when he has sanctity within his power. This aspect has been well summarized in a paper read before the meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America in 1955:

If acquired habits are important for the practice of supernatural virtues, then it is of supreme importance that the child be trained in good natural habits from his earliest formative years both in home and school. Natural motives should be presented to the students as well as supernatural motives, provided the natural incentives remain subordinate to the supernatural. The aim must be to integrate the ideals of faith with those of reason and to present them to the child as a harmonious whole. The child must be taught that natural values are good, but they must be made to serve him on his way to his supernatural destiny. He must be shown that God expects him to practice the natural virtues if he wishes to make full use of the gifts and virtues which God has infused into his soul at Baptism.<sup>41</sup>

What of one who has actually acquired bad habits, and who, repenting, receives the infused virtues together with sanctifying grace? Is it possible for infused virtue to exist with vice in the same subject? That at least the remains of vice can exist together with the infused virtues, is an all too common experience. The penitent is truly



sorry for his past sins, habitual mortal sins, perhaps. In the sacrament of Penance grace and the virtues are restored, yet how often he commits the same sin again and again. If the effects of acquired vice is such, even when subjected to the power of grace, one may judge of the importance of natural virtue, and the necessity of acquiring it. It is in this phase of their relationship that the interpenetration of the acquired and the infused virtues is most evident. The sinner's good will and the power of grace cannot supply entirely for lack of acquired virtue, apart from an extraordinary grace.

One distinction is important at this point. Vice is opposed, not to the supernatural virtue, but the natural. That which is opposed to infused virtue is sin, a formal turning away from one's supernatural end.<sup>42</sup> As has been stressed, the infused and acquired virtues differ specifically, and thus when a habit contrary to a natural virtue is generated, it is only indirectly contrary to the infused virtue, though under the formality of sin it is directly opposed.

Cardinal Billot clarifies the issue of the co-existence of virtue and vice by distinguishing a material and formal aspect to virtue and vice. Materially it is the physical inclination to good or to evil, which the repetition

of previous acts has generated and left behind. The formal aspect is the persevering adherence of the will to the objects of the aforesaid acts, which adherence determines the morality of the act. If it is a question of a vice, when one sincerely repents the formal aspect of the vice ceases to be present, though the physical inclination continues as a disposition in a certain condition of destruction.<sup>43</sup>

Lumbreras uses the same argumentation:

Since infused virtues are generated by a single act, they can be accompanied by the contrary disposition of the subject. These contrary dispositions lose their condition of vices, no matter how rooted these may be in the subject, inasmuch as the subject, heretofore vicious, retracts his former vices, which on this account cease being voluntary. . . The justified is also powerfully inclined by the infused virtues to the acts contrary to those vices.<sup>44</sup>

In the same vein Lumbreras quotes another modern theologian, Godoy, as follows:

From the teaching of St. Thomas it may be gathered that bad habits remain in the recently justified, not according to the mode of habits, but rather as dispositions; not because habits are changed into dispositions, for since habits differ specifically from dispositions in the more widely accepted thought of Thomists, such a change cannot be brought about; but because it is possible that the remains of vice exist as habits according to substance, not, however, according to mode. Rather they take on the mode of dispositions, and, on account of the inclination to good which grace operates in the subject, they remain only as tending to destruction, and consequently easily removed from the subject.<sup>45</sup>

St. Thomas' own words on the subject are taken from

The Virtues in General:



Although an acquired habit is not destroyed by a single (natural) act, nevertheless, by the power of grace, an act of contrition has the effect of destroying a vicious habit which has been formed or acquired. Therefore, when the habit of intemperance is broken, it no longer remains as a habit in one who had it, along with the infused virtue of temperance, but it remains only as a form on its way to corruption, as a sort of disposition.<sup>46</sup>

In Quaestione Disputata on the Cardinal Virtues

St. Thomas says further:

Although one is able to act promptly and with delight because of habit, it can happen that this can be impeded by some intervening cause; thus a man having the habit of knowledge may be unable to use it because of sleep or intoxication or some other reason. So also is it with him who repents. He receives together with sanctifying grace, charity and all the other habits of virtue, but on account of dispositions left by former sinful acts, he experiences difficulty in the execution of the habitual virtues he has received, because such a one has not acquired virtue through the repetition of acts, through which, at the same time, both contrary dispositions are removed and the habit of virtue generated.<sup>47</sup>

All this brings the matter back to the status previously considered, in which the infused virtue must operate in the absence of the acquired, and the obstacle of contrary dispositions must be overcome by the activity of the supernatural virtues. Since the sacramental grace of Penance is a special help to prevent the commission of confessed sins again, that assistance could be profitably used to cultivate the natural virtue corresponding to the infused virtue one needs most to exercise. Thus, one who has sinned



seriously against justice by cheating should strive earnestly to acquire the virtue of strict honesty in all his work, whether it be academic, or in the realm of government or business. A resolution not to do again the one thing in which one failed is not going to eradicate the evil, for the disposition towards injustice remains and can easily issue in a different act. It is not going to be replaced by the virtue of justice, except by a consistent repetition of acts as often as the opportunity occurs.

The effect of the exercise of the infused virtues upon the acquisition of the natural virtues should certainly not be overlooked. The Dictionnaire de Theologie in treating of the natural habits as simply dispositive says: "The habit (here the word is exact) generated by the repetition of supernatural acts is natural, and in relation to these, simply dispositive . . ." <sup>48</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange also studies the same problem:

From a repetition of acts of natural love of God there results only a certain facility, by reason of the removal of extrinsic obstacles. For example, from the repetition of the act of laughing no habit is generated, for man is naturally moved to laughter only when the occasion presents itself. . . (Likewise, from the repetition of acts of supernatural charity no acquired habit is generated, but a disposition for increase of charity). <sup>49</sup>

There seems little doubt that the practice of the infused virtues, although it cannot bring about the presence of the

acquired, can dispose for them. However, as has been mentioned, the exercise of the infused virtues is impeded by extrinsic obstacles that loom up because of the absence of the acquired virtues. If one lacks an acquired virtue, one already has an inclination away from right reason, which entails also a deviation from one's last end, since, though not the same, they are related.

The Dictionnaire de Theologie sums it up thus:

The supernatural virtues, at least at the beginning of their presence in the soul, are in no way able to communicate facility of exercise to our faculties. Any "facility" is restricted to the power of acting in the supernatural order, and this power is certainly not a simple physical capability for action. . . . Becoming aware of the supernatural good, the object of virtue, our soul realizes its value and ought to experience a real inclination and a genuine attraction in its regard. This attraction will be expressed by a firm resolution which the exercise of the virtue, sustained by divine grace, will make triumph over contrary passions and exterior difficulties. Faith, and a spirit of faith, are the foundation of this inclination which, nature, left to itself, would be incapable of calling forth or maintaining.<sup>50</sup>

Habits confer ease, promptitude, and delight in operation. In the fortunate person who has been trained, or who has trained himself, in the practice of acquired virtue, and who has, moreover, the inestimable gift of sanctifying grace, what is the effect of the one upon the other?

The ease with which an act is performed may be increased by the cooperation of the natural and supernatural habits. The material object of both is the same - some par-



ticular, good, human action. The presence of an acquired habit means that the action will be performed with ease, promptitude and a certain pleasure. The man who has performed repeated acts of justice, and has thus the acquired habit, pays his just debts with all those qualities. Such a one does not make his income tax returns a quarter of an hour before the deadline. There has been no quibbling, no feeling that he is unfairly treated by the world in general and by the United States government in particular, for recognizing a debt in justice, he meets it quietly and willingly, though he is naturally no more anxious than anyone else to relinquish so desirable a sum of money. In him the infused virtue of justice can also be operative, raising his act of paying his income tax to the supernatural level, an achievement impossible to unaided human virtue. The alacrity with which the act is performed, however, belongs to the natural or acquired virtue.

That the man may still regret the money, St. Thomas explains in the following:

The passions which incline us towards evil are not completely suppressed by either acquired or infused virtue, unless it be in an extraordinary and miraculous manner. For the struggle of the flesh against the spirit always remains. . .

Acquired and infused virtues accomplish different effects in the subduing of passions. Acquired virtue effects that the attacks of concupiscence be felt less. This effect results from the causality of acquired virtue; by the frequent acts whereby a man grows accus-



tomed to virtue, he gradually grows unaccustomed to obey his passions and begins to resist them. From this there ensues that he senses their attack the less. Infused virtue is of value in that, even though the passions be felt, still they in no way gain control. For infused virtue effects that a man in no way obey the concupiscences of sin; and while this virtue remains, it does this infallibly. Acquired virtue falls short in this respect, although only in a few instances, as other natural inclinations fail in only a minor part.<sup>51</sup>

The relationship is expressed thus by Garrigou-Lagrange:

In the just man, charity commands or inspires the act of acquired temperance by the intermediary of the simultaneous act of infused temperance. And even outside the production of their acts, since these two virtues are united in the same faculty, the infused confirms the acquired. Only in those Christians who live a moral supernatural life does the supernatural most appear as the explicit motive of acting; in others it is a rational motive, and the supernatural remains somewhat latent (*remissus*). Similarly, one pianist may show great technique and a modicum of inspiration, while in another the inverse may be true.<sup>52</sup>

## CHAPTER III

## THE INCREASE OF THE ACQUIRED AND INFUSED MORAL VIRTUES

Thus far the discussion has turned on the exercise of the acquired and infused moral virtues. Does the exercise of one influence the growth of the other, and if so, in what way?

Virtues may be considered as capable of a twofold growth: extensive and intensive.<sup>53</sup> Extensive growth in a virtue means that it reaches to more and more objects. For any but the intellectual virtues this is manifestly impossible. If one is truly just, for example, then one gives to everyone his due, and no person is outside the pale of that justice. An increase in the virtue will not mean that a man will practice justice towards more and more individuals. Intellect alone is capable of reaching to an increased number of objects, as a man may know physics, philosophy, and art. In the very broadening of his fields of knowledge, his intellectual virtues are extended, in that they comprehend different objects. They may also be intensified, which is the second manner in which virtues may increase. In this way they become more firmly radicated



in man's soul, and this may be true of the intellectual virtues, as a man may perfect his knowledge of philosophy, not by knowing more, but by possessing more securely what he has already grasped. It is, however, the only way the moral virtues may increase. By a growth in the virtue of justice it will be more intensively in the will, and one will act, not with justice towards more men, but with greater justice towards all men. No matter what degree of justice one possesses, one gives to every man his due, and the object of justice does not change with any increase in the virtue.

An increase in an acquired virtue, like its exercise, can be only dispositive in relation to the infused virtue. But this effect is not to be minimized, for a favorable disposition assures an increase in the infused virtues, since any act of the virtue has as its effect in the soul the meriting of an increase in charity, and hence of the virtue. This brings up two points which have not been touched upon: the connection of the infused virtues with charity, and remiss acts.

St. Thomas shows in a number of places that the moral virtues are all connected in charity, but his argument is well expressed thus:

Now it is evident that charity, in as much as it directs him to his last end, is the principle of

all the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind of good work.<sup>54</sup>

Garrigou-Lagrange indicates clearly the relationship between virtuous acts and growth in virtue:

The acts of charity and of the virtues inspired by it do not merit, from the moral point of view, solely the increase of charity, but they dispose the soul physically to receive it, in the sense that, as it were, they open our faculties that they may receive more.<sup>55</sup>

The second point brought up in a consideration of the increase of virtue is that of remiss acts. It is only too well known from personal experience that it is possible to perform an act of virtue which falls below the degree of intensity to which the habit is possessed. Thus one having the acquired and infused virtues of temperance might take two cocktails, when grace urges him to take only one. Two do him no harm, but he knows that the disciplining of his taste would be a way of bringing his body into subjection. Does he merit an increase of charity and the virtues by such an imperfect act? St. Thomas thinks so: ". . . every (even imperfect) act of charity merits an increase of charity; yet this increase does not take place at once, but when we strive for that increase".<sup>56</sup> Only when, by an intense and generous act, man has disposed himself for that increase, is it effected.

It stands to reason, however, that the acquired vir-



tues facilitate so much the placing of acts of the infused virtues that a person who has cultivated the natural virtues is in a particularly favorable disposition to exercise his supernatural powers, and thus merit an increase of charity and the virtues.

The ordinary Christian is probably more anxious to learn if an increase of the infused virtues has any effect upon the natural good habits, since that would offer a way to avoid much self-discipline. Garigou-Lagrange is not too optimistic:

These virtues grow together with charity because of their connection with this virtue, just as the different parts of our physical organism grow simultaneously. But the infused moral virtues grow especially with charity. The acquired virtues may not develop as much, if they are not sufficiently exercised.<sup>57</sup>

Elsewhere he says:

The acquired moral virtues minister, as it were, to the infused, and so are increased together with them, at least to a certain degree, when the increase of the infused virtues is brought about ex opere operantis. It is in somewhat the way that the agility of the fingers increases in the musician, together with his art, which is in the practical intellect.<sup>58</sup>

Billot has studied the matter also, and although making a very much more detailed inquiry, gives much the same answer. He reasons from the general principle that a passive thing receives the impression of an active principle according to the mode by which it is constituted to receive it, neither more or less. He uses the analogy of wax receiving the im-

pression of a seal by the physical force exerted on it, whereas it would in no way receive the impression were the chemical means used in etching metals employed. In like manner, supernatural acts make no impression on the faculties according to any supernatural mode, for the natural faculties are not ordained to receive supernatural dispositions, except through the obediential power which responds to the active power of God alone.

However, because the supernatural acts by their inclination towards an object which they would have, even apart from the supernatural, that is the material object, impress the faculty in the same way as do the natural acts, leaving in it a disposition to an act of like inclination, and through this make it possible for a natural habit to be generated.<sup>59</sup>

The opinion of theologians varies considerably on this matter of the effect of the practice of infused virtue on the formation of a natural habit. Merkelbach maintains that a natural act is virtually contained in every supernatural act, and that a natural habit is acquired by repeated acts of the supernatural virtue.<sup>60</sup> However, Thomists in general hold that:

. . . repeated supernatural acts of the infused virtues generate a natural acquired habit, not formally and directly, but dispositively, that is to say, the repetition of acts of the infused



virtues dispose the potency toward acquiring a natural habit of the same virtues. Constant exercise of the infused virtues leaves its traces in the faculties, particularly in memory; and these impressions dispose the subject to the exercise of virtue.<sup>61</sup>

Although Father Harvey inclines to the view that acts of the infused virtues generate a natural habit, it is difficult to harmonize this with the Thomistic principle that habits are specified by acts, and acts by the formal object. Though eternal life and the good of reason are congruous, they are not the same, and they cannot formally specify the same virtue, though it is certainly reasonable and within the teaching of St. Thomas to say that one may dispose for the other. St. Thomas says in De Veritate:

From these repeated acts a habit, different from that by which the acts are elicited, is not generated, but either a habit of the same nature, as from acts of charity is generated a habit of love, or an already existing habit is strengthened, as in him who has by repeated acts acquired the virtue of temperance, this very habit is increased.<sup>62</sup>

It would seem that the exercise of the infused virtues can bring about a strengthening of the acquired virtue, which is reasonable, since an acquired virtue is in the relationship of an instrument to an agent, and an increase in acquired virtue is the result of human activity. Increase in the acquired virtues can dispose a man for the practice of the infused virtues, making such practice easier by the removal of obstacles, thus contributing indirectly to the increase

of the infused virtue, which, however, can be effected only by God.



## CONCLUSION

One truth emerges more or less clearly from these considerations, and it is that, for a well-ordered supernatural life, one needs both acquired and infused moral virtues. The former without the latter are useless in the final attainment of man's ultimate end; the latter without the former cannot ordinarily operate in such a manner that man will strive for his supernatural goal with the enthusiasm God means him to have. If one must choose between them, it is, of course, infinitely preferable to have the infused virtues.

In the fulfillment of the purpose of life there is, however, never really a choice. Nature requires that we cultivate by repeated acts the seeds of natural virtue. One who fails to do this is not fulfilling his obligations in the natural order. On the other hand, a more perfect virtue produces a more perfect human act, and it is by human acts, informed and elevated by grace, that we are to attain our supernatural end. It stands to reason that in the ordinary dispensation of God's dealings with souls, grace will be the more effective in attaining its end when it acts upon faculties already oriented in the right general direction, for man's proximate good ends cannot be in opposition to his ultimate end, though they may be on a

lower plane.

The musician's talent and his technical skill provide, perhaps, the most illuminating analogy. If he has, by constant practice, acquired certain very intricate muscular and auditory habits, he will be able to produce music corresponding to his art which is in his practical intellect.

With less skill he does less justice to his inner artistic inspiration which, however, is not lost thereby, though it will be difficult to maintain it at its intensity. The skill without the inner fire is destined to a certain frustration and ultimate degeneration of even the acquired agility of the fingers.

The true musician unites in a common action his skill and his artistic ability, and in it both are strengthened and more firmly radicated in his being. In the same way, one who has the acquired virtue of justice, for example, and performs an act of justice from a supernatural motive, strengthens the acquired habit and merits an increase of the infused.

The man possessing the infused virtues and not the acquired is like the musician possessing the art, but not the practical skill. As he cannot give adequate expression to his inspiration, so man finds his acts of the infused virtues hampered in execution by a lack of ease and pleasure that would be supplied by the acquired virtues. The endeavor to express his artistic intuition will indirectly condition the



musician for the acquisition of skill, if he consistently repeats exercises with his fingers, etc. In somewhat the same way the act of the infused virtue, since it has the same material object as the acquired, will dispose for the acquisition of the natural virtue, though it cannot cause it.

On the other hand, the piano player who has a highly developed technique and no real inner artistic ability will never acquire it, despite long hours of practice, for there is no one to give him the talent, apart from the intervention of God. Happily, in the order of habits, it is possible for the practice of the acquired virtues to dispose the soul for the infusion of the supernatural virtues, which infusion God alone can give, and does give freely and generously, though man can in no way merit it.

The emphasis has a tendency to fall on the acquired virtues, not with any intention of minimizing the infused, but more because the acquisition of natural virtue is somehow overlooked in our training of youth. Perhaps this is because of our deep appreciation of the superiority of the supernatural, which should in no way be dulled. It is possible too that there may be a trace of Manichaeism, in one form or another; an uncomfortable feeling that one should not strive to attain habitually the good of reason, when a higher goal is set before us. But one can more quickly reach the higher end by following the very orientation of our nature towards the reasonable good, implanted in it by God Himself as a means, secondary to be sure, of bringing us to Himself.

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4. Ibid., q. 63, a. 1.
5. Ibid., q. 51, a. 1.
6. Ibid., q. 50, a. 5, ad 3um.
7. Pieper, op. cit., p. 34.
8. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 1 um.
9. Ibid. I, q. 73, a. 1; I-II, q. 85, a. 10, ad 2um.; II-II, q. 146, a. 4.
10. Ibid., I-II, q. 51, aa. 2,3.
11. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Quaestiones Disputatae; De Virtutibus Cardinalibus, (Turin: Marietti, MCMXXIV), q. 1, a. 2, ad 5um.
12. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 56, aa. 4, 6.
13. Ibid., q. 50, aa. 3,4,5,; q. 56, a. 4.
14. De Virt. Card., q. 1, a. 1.
15. St. Thomas Aquinas, The Virtues in General, translated by John Patrick Reid, O.P. (Providence: Providence College Press, 1951), a. 10, ad 1lum.
16. Tabaraud-Trincarella, Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ane, 1946), XV, col. 2782



La seule solution acceptable semble être de considérer la volonté elle-même comme le sujet des vertus infuses de tempérance et de force. Par ces vertus, la volonté serait habilitée à utiliser les bonnes dispositions naturelles de l'organisme pour les conformer habituellement à la règle non seulement de la raison, mais de la foi et de la charité. Cette conformité habituelle serait, dans l'organisme humain, non la vertu infuse, mais son complément.

17. St. Thomas Aquinas, The Virtues in General, a. 4, ad 2um.
18. Ludovico Billot, S.I., De Virtutibus Infusis, (Romae: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, MDCCCXXIII), pp. 115-116.
19. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 63, a. 4.
20. St. Thomas Aquinas, The Virtues in General, a. 2., ad 2lum.
21. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 63, a. 4.
22. Ibid., a. 2.
23. Ibid., a. 4.
24. Peter Lumberras, O.P., "Notes on the Connection of the Virtues", The Thomist, XI (April, 1948), pp. 232-233.
25. Reginaldus Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., De Virtutibus Theologicis (Torino: Casa Editrice Marietti, 1949), p. 4.

... 1. habitus ut forma in nobis recepta, specificantur et distinguuntur secundum diversa eorum principia activa a quibus producuntur, prout omne agens facit sibi simile, in quantum agit secundum suam propriam determinationem. Sic habitus infusi sunt participatio vitae intimae Dei a quo producuntur; item virtutes morales acquisite sic specificantur ab actu rationis dirigentis a qua generantur.



2. Habitus, proprie ut habitus, relate ad naturam cui conveniunt vel disconveniunt, specificantur et distinguuntur secundum naturam cui conveniunt vel disconveniunt. Habitus infusi secundum naturam divinam participatam; habitus acquisiti secundum naturam humanam cui conveniunt (ut virtutes) aut disconveniunt (ut vitia).

3. Habitus operativi, relate ad eorum operationem, specificantur et distinguuntur secundum objecta operationem specie differentia. Sic habitus infusi specificantur ab objecto essentialiter supernaturali, habitus acquisiti ab objecto naturaliter accessibili.

26. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 2., a.9, ad 1um.

27. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, (Parisiis: Lethielleux, 1929), II, Dist. XL, q. 1. a.5, ad 6um.

Non sufficit omnino habitualis ordinatio actus in Deum: quia ex hoc quod est in habitu, nullus meretur, sed ex hoc quod actu operatur. Nec tamen oportet quod intentio actualis ordinans in finem ultimum sit semper conjuncta cuilibet actioni quae dicitur in aliquem finem proximum; sed sufficit quod aliquando actualiter omnes illi fines in finem ultimum referantur, sicut fit quando aliquis cogitat se totum ad Dei dilectionem dirigere; tunc enim quidquid ad seipsum ordinat, in Deum ordinatum erit.

28. Goudin, P.F. Antonii, Tractatus Theologici, (Lovanii: Typis Caroli Peeters, 1874), pp. 415-416.

29. Mt 5, 46.

30. 1 Cor 10, 31.

31. Garrigou-Lagrange, Reverend Reginald, O.P., Grace, translated by the Dominican Nuns, (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1952), p. 7.

32. Mt 25, 40.

33. St. Thomas, The Virtues in General a. 9, ad 5um.



34. Ibid.
35. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 65, a. 2.
36. Ibid.
37. Dictionnaire de Theologie, Vol, XV, Col. 2769.

Les actes humains, cause materielle dispositive (des vertus infus). Avec le secours de la grace actuelle operante ou cooperante, l'activite humaine a son role a jouer dans la production des vertus comme dans celle de la grace. Ce role est celui d'une causalite purement materielle, en tant que nos actes disposent le sujet a recevoir grace et vertus. Ces dispositions surnaturelles peuvent s'affirmer simplement comme des actes eloignant de notre ame la disposition contraire a la grace, l'attachement au peche mortel; c'est la disposition appelee par la theologie removens prohibens. C'est le cas d'attrition. Mais nos actes peuvent aller plus loin et, par suite de leur perfection meme, atteindre le seuil de la vie surnaturelle, produisant en nous une disposition positive qui appelle, qui exige l'infusion de la grace et des vertus. C'est le cas de la contrition parfaite dans la justification ex opere operantis. Dans l'un et l'autre cas, la causalite propre de nos actes demeure purement materielle et n'atteint que les dispositions de l'ame. Seule la causalite divine atteint effectivement grace et vertus.

38. St. Thomas, The Virtues in General, a. 2, ad 18um.
39. Garrigou-Lagrange, De Virtutibus Theologicis, p. 26.

S. Thomas autem ostendit quod verae virtutes morales acquisitae possunt esse in statu dispositionis facile mobilis sine caritate ut fuerunt in multis gentilibus; non vero possunt esse sine caritate in statu virtutis difficile mobilis, quia homo sine caritate est directe aversus a fine ultimo supernaturali, et indirecte aversus a fine naturali, prout jam lex naturalis praecipit: "obediendum est Deo



quidquid jubeat, etiam in altiori ordine". Et homo aversus a fine ultimo facile inclinatur ad malum ita ut verae virtutes morales acquisite non possint in eo esse in statu virtutis difficile mobilis, sed tamen possunt esse verae virtutes ex parte objecti, in statu dispositionis ex parte subjecti, id est in via aut generationis aut corruptionis; et jam post unum peccatum mortale, quo amittitur caritas, incipiunt esse hae virtutes in statu declinationis, in via ad corruptionem. Cf. I-II, q. 71, a. 4.

40. St. Thomas, The Virtues in General, a. 10, ad 15um.
41. Harvey, John F., O.S.F.S., "The Nature of the Infused Moral Virtues," The Catholic Theological Society of America, Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Convention, (1955), p. 216.
42. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 24, a. 12; I-II, q. 63, a. 2, ad 2um.
43. Billot, De Virtutibus Infusis, p. 80.
44. Lumbreras, The Thomist, XI, (April, 1948), p. 233.
45. Ibid., quoting Godoy, Disp. Theol., in I-II, disp. 15.
46. St. Thomas, The Virtues in General, a. 10, ad 16 um.
47. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Omnia Opera, secundum impressionem Petri Fiaccadori, Parmae 1852-1873, (New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949), VIII, Quaestio Unica de Virtutibus Cardinalibus, Art. II, ad 2um.

Ad secundum dicendum quod cum habitus secundum se facit prompte et delectabiliter operari, potest tamen hoc impediri per aliquid superveniens; sicut habens habitum scientiae interdum impeditur ad ejus usum per somnolentiam vel ebrietatem, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Sic ergo iste qui poenitet, consequitur cum gratia gratum faciente, caritatem, et omnes alios habitus virtutum; sed propter dispositiones ex actibus priorum peccatorum relictas patitur difficultatem in executione virtutum quas habitualiter recipit; quod quidem non contingit in



virtutibus acquisitis per exercitium actuum;  
per quos simul et contrariae dispositiones  
tolluntur, et habitus virtutum generantur.

48. Dictionnaire de Theologie, XV, col. 2768.

L'habitude (ici le mot est exact) engendree  
par la repetition des actes surnaturels est  
naturelle, et par rapport a ceux-ci, simple-  
ment dispositive. . .

49. Garrigou-Lagrange, De Virtutibus Theologicis, pp.  
10-11.

. . .ex repetitione actuum amoris naturalis Dei  
inducitur solum quaedam FACILITAS ex remotione  
impedimentorum extrinsecorum. Sicut ex repeti-  
tione actus ridendi non generatur habitus, quia  
homo jam naturaliter determinatur ad ridendum  
occasione data.

. . .(Item ex repetitione actuum caritatis super-  
naturalis non generatur habitus acquisitus, sed  
dispositio ad augmentum caritatis.)

50. Dictionnaire de Theologie, XV, col. 2766.

Les vertus surnaturelles, du moins au debut de  
leur presence dans l'ame, ne savaient communi-  
quer a nos facultes cette facilite d'exercise.  
La "facilite" se reduit ici, des l'abord, du  
pouvoir d'agir dans l'ordre surnaturel. Ce  
pouvoir, certes, n'est pas une simple possibil-  
ite physique d'action. . . Prenant conscience  
du bien surnaturel, object de la vertu, notre  
ame en saisit la valeur et doit ressentir a son  
egard un penchant reel et un veritable attrait.  
Ce sentiment se traduira par une ferme adhesion  
que l'exercice de la vertu, soutenu par la grace  
divine, rendra victorieuse des passions con-  
traires et des difficultes exterieures. La foi  
et l'esprit de foi sont a la base de cet attrait,  
que la nature laissee a elle-meme serait incap-  
able de provoquer et de maintenir.

51. St. Thomas, The Virtues in General, a. 10, ad 14 um.

52. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., The Three Ages of  
the Interior Life, Translated by Sister M.



Timothea Doyle, O.P.. (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Company, 1947), I, p. 64, n. 15.

53. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 52, a. 1, 2.
54. Ibid., q. 65, a. 3.
55. Garrigou-Lagrange, The Three Ages of the Interior Life, I, p. 134.
56. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 24, a. 6, ad lum.
57. Garrigou-Lagrange, The Three Ages of the Interior Life, I, p. 65, n. 23.
58. Garrigou-Lagrange, De Virtutibus Theologicis, p. 26.

Virtutes autem morales acquisitae prout subserviunt infusis, proportionaliter etiam augentur cum eis, saltem aliquatenus, quando augmentum virtutum infusarum fit ex opere operantis. Ita in musico augetur agilitas manuum cum arte quae est in intellectu practico.

59. Billot, De Virtutibus Infusis, p. 45.
60. Benedictus H. Merkelbach, O.P., Summa Theologiae Moralis, (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer & Cie, 1947.), I, n. 621.
61. Harvey, op. cit., pp. 208-209.
62. S. Thomae Aquinatis, Omnia Opera, IX, De Veritate, q. XVII, a. 1, ad 4um.

. . .quod ex his actibus (multiplicatis) non generatur habitus alterius modi ab illo habitu ex quo actus eliciuntur; sed vel aliquis habitus ejusdem rationis, sicut ex actibus infusae caritatis generatur habitus aliquis dilectionis, vel praeexistens augmentatur: sicut in eo qui habet habitum temperantiae acquisitum ex actibus, ipse habitus augmentatur.



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